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death statute in lieu of the FDHSA. But this interpretation could only
increase the probability that a New York court in hearing the case would
infringe on the substantive rights accorded by the FDHSA. Why then
should a New York tribunal not be allowed to sit as a procedural enforce-
ment medium in judgment of the case under the FDHSA? The only
conclusion which can be reached is that neither the available legislative
history, nor a logical interpretation of the act, appear to demand an ad-
miralty forum. Representative Mann, who propounded the amendment
which struck from the act the provision that state jurisdiction would be
unaffected -only as to causes of action accruing within a state's territorial
limits, expressed his doubts as to where jurisdiction would lie under the
act;25 and in fact some 250 members of the House who voted on the amend-
ment were not present when the discussion on the floor took place.26
No words in the act demand an admiralty forum. It is submitted that
the question in each case should be whether the substantive rights and
liabilities which accrued to the parties on the happening of the event in
litigation will be enforced by recourse to the procedure of the non-admiralty
court in which the suit is filed. It must be remembered that if suit is
brought under the FDHSA in a non-admiralty court, one substantial dif-
ference which will be present is the possibility of resort to a jury trial. It
has been argued that the complexities of an admiralty case are too great
to be sifted and weighed intelligently by a jury.27  Whether this or any
other factor will serve to subvert the substantive rights of the FDHSA is
a question that may be settled only by the Supreme Court.
JAMES H. SWEENY, III
STATE COURTROOM DOORS CLOSED TO EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The petitioner was convicted in a state court of knowingly having
had in her possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious
books, pictures, and photographs in violation of a state law.' The
25. "[M]y impression, which very likely may be erroneous, is that the purpose
of the bill was to confer jurisdiction in certain eases of death where no jurisdiction
now exists. I was under the impression that the bill was not intended to take away
any jurisdiction which can now be exercised by any State court." 59 CONe. REC.
4484 (1920).
26. See 59 CONG. REc. 4486 (1920).
27. Smith, Jury Trials for Admiralty Cases? No! 2 FEn. B. NErws 49 (1954).
1. Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34 (Baldwin 1958). The statute provides in
pertinent part that: "No person shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his
control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, [or] . . . picture .... "
[VOL. XVI
CASES NOTED
evidence which led to her conviction had been obtained during an illegal
search of her home by police officers. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the
conviction because the evidence had not been taken from the defendant's
person "by the use of 'brutal or offensive' physical force .... 2 Held,
reversed: all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
fourth amendment to the Constitution is, by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause, inadmissible in a state court. Map, v. Ohio,
81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961).
For many years, courts generally held that the admissibility of evidence
was not affected by the illegality of the means through which the evidence
was obtained. 3  The federal exclusionary rule had its origin in 1886 as
obiter dictim in Boyd v. United States.4 Weeks v. United States5
firmly established the rule that barred the admission in federal criminal
prosecutions of evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of the
defendant's rights under the fourth amendment. Decisions since Weeks
have strengthened the force of the ruling." The exclusionary rule gained
additional strength in 1960 with the discarding of the "silver platter"
doctrine.7  In Elkins v. United States,8 the Court held that evidence
obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal
officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity .from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment was inadmissible over the
defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial.9
In 1949, in the leading case of Wolf v. Colorado,1° the Supreme
Court held that a conviction by a state court for a state offense did not
deny the due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment, solely
2. Ohio v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 430, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389-90 (1960). Four
of seven, judges were of the opinion that the section of the code under which she was
convicted was unconstitutional. 01io CONST. art. IV, § 2 provides that: "No law shall
be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of
at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the court
of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void." The court stated that a "reasonable
argument" could be made that the conviction should be reversed because the methods
used to obtain the evidence "were such as to 'offend a sense of justice,' " but it did
not find this fact determinative.
3. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
4. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Supreme Court, in Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585 (1904), seemingly repudiated the views expressed in Boyd, and apparently
approved the prevailing state or common law view.
5. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
See also, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Abel v. United States, 362
U.S. 217 (1960); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
7. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
8. Ibid.
9. See 15 U. MIAMI L. REv. 318 (1961).
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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because the evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment's.
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court agreed
that the prohibition of the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures was enforceable against the. states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated, however, that
the constitutional prohibition did not require that it be enforced by
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained in violation of it.12
The common-law rule that the admissibility of evidence is not affected
by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained has had strong
support.'-' Conversely, the exclusionary rule forbidding the use of this
evidence has been adopted in a number of states 4 and has not lacked
advocates.',
The majority opinion in Mapp v. Ohio,' in overruling Wolf v.
Colorado,17 relied to a surprising degree upon the rationale of the
Court in Wolf. After reciting at length the development of the federal
exclusionary rule (in federal trials) in the Boyd and Weeks cases, the
opinion stated that the use of illegally obtained evidence involved a denial
of the constitutional rights of the accused. It was emphasized that the
protection of the fourth amendment against searches and seizures is of no
value if the information secured can be utilized against the accused. The
majority viewed the action of the Court in Wolf as a decision that the
exclusionary rule would not then be imposed upon the states rather than
a decision that the rule could not be imposed."'
Mr. Justice Clark regarded the failure in the past to apply the ex-
clusionary rule to the states in marked contrast to the.action of the Court
in other areas of human rights. The Court has not hesitated to enforce,
as strictly against the states as it does against the federal government, the
rights of free speech and of a free press, the right to a fair public trial
and the right not to be convicted through use of a cderced confession. 9
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. at 27-29.
13. The leading state case rejecting the exclusionary rule was decided in 1926
when justice (then Judge) Cardozo wrote the opinion in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.
13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). Ile reasoned that the result of the exclusion of such evidence
would be that "the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Dean
Wigmore has deemed the exclusionary rule as "misplaced sentimentality." 8 WICMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
14. For the status prior to Majp v. Ohio of the rule governing admissibility of
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956);
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184(a) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
15. Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d
Cir. 1945), stated: "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed."
Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329 (1922); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 281-98 (1954).
See also, Reynard, Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizure-A Second Class
Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259 (1960).
16. 81 Sup. Ct. 1684 (1961).
17. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
18. Mapp v. Ohio, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 1689 (1961).
19, Id. at 1692.
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Finally, the majority expressed the view that the double ,standard
that has existed in the past tends to destroy the entire constitutional
system of restraints upon which the liberties of the people rest. Since
the fourth amendment's' right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the states, it is enforceable, by the same sanction of exclusion as is
used against the federal government in federal trials.
20
Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the minority, expressed the view that
the exclusionary rule was only a remedy which, by penalizing past official
misconduct, was aimed at deterring this conduct in the future.21  The
Court, by its action in the present case, is imposing upon the states not
only the federal substantive standards of search and seizure but also the
federal penalties for violation of those standards. The dissenters disagreed
with the view that the fourteenth amendment empowers the Court to
develop standards and procedures of judicial administration within the
judicial systems of the states. The remedies within the judicial system for
state courts rest with the highest courts of the states, and the Supreme
Court should restrict its supervision to the judicial system over which it
presides.
22
Those who have supported the enforcement of rights guaranteed under
the fourth amendment as of equal importance to the enforcement of other
constitutional guarantees will be encouraged by Mapp. The effect upon
law enforcement agencies cannot be ignored. Police officers must now
obtain a search warrant before searches if they wish to use the evidence
obtained thereby. However, problems confronting the local police officer
are by nature complicated and often require prompt police action. The
decision in Mapp will force courts to free criminals who might have been
convicted under previous procedures.
The retroactive effect of the decision cannot be forecast from the
opinion. Will there be a demand for the release of those who have been
convicted in trials where evidence, now constitutionally inadmissible, was
admitted?23  There is an analogy here to the invalidation of a criminal
20. Id. at 1691.
21. Id. at 1705.
22. Id. at 1706. The minority pointed out that Mr. Justice Black was unwilling
to subscribe to the view that the Weeks exclusionary rule derives from the fourth
amendment itself, but joined the majority opinion on the premise that its end result
could be achieved by bringing the fifth amendment to the aid of the fourth. For the
separate concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, see Id. at 1694-98. The minority
opinion also expressed the view that the Court "reached out" to overrule Wolf, thereby
choosing the more difficult and less appropriate of the two constitutional questions posed
by the case. Id. at 1702.
23. The action of the Court as to whether a decision is to be applied retroactively
or prospectively is by no means uniform. See the concurring opinion of Mr. justice
Frankfurter in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE (1935); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 517 (1945).
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statute. The question cannot be answered finally until a case reaches the
Supreme Court.
24
The most important question is the extent to which Mapp portends
other changes in the procedures of state courts in criminal trials.2 a IS
uniformity of state and federal procedure to become a substantive right
guaranteed under the Constitution? Will the Court use the criteria of the
federal court system (i.e., the sixth amendment standard) to judge the
adequacy of a state's measures that govern the rights of an accused to
counsel?20  Cbrtainly alert counsel, relying upon Mapp, will press these
and similar questions.27  The fact that less than a majority of the Court
agreed upon the rationale of this opinion makes an estimate of the future
actions of the Court in this area difficult.
CAREY A. RANDALL
24. One court has interpreted Mapp's application as prospective only. People v.
Figueroa, 220 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Kings County Ct. 1961).
25. Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368, 370 (2d Cir. 1961): "The scope of Mapp
is, however, unclear in several regards, such as its application to federal statutory or
rule, as well as constitutional, prohibitions or to state administrative proceedings such
as those of the Waterfront Commission."
26. McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
27. People v. Tyler, 14 Cal. Rptr. 610 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). The court found
nothing in Mapp to indicate that the states are bound to follow the federal requirements
of reasonable and probable cause instead of their own.
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